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Abstract 
Previous work in experimental economics reveals specific differences in 
economic behavior, especially reciprocity and free-riding behavior, across 
cultures.  We expand the possible pallet of cross-cultural behavioral differences 
that may exist. We hypothesize that different kinds of strategic interaction and 
individual decision-making behaviors differ across locations. The variety of 
experiments we use allow us to report multidimensional rather than just single 
dimensional differences in behavior across locations. In order to build a broad 
Homo Economicus we conducted economic experiments in four dissimilar 
locations: Hangzhou, China; Niamey, Niger; Grenoble, France; Manhattan, 
Kansas; and West Lafayette, Indiana.  Each subject completed an ultimatum 
bargaining game experiment, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiment, 
time preference experiment, and risk preference experiment. Results indicate 
economic behavior is not independent of location. Location differences are 
greatest for strategic interaction behavior and less prevalent for individual 
decision-making behavior.  
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A Multidimensional Homo Economicus: Dimensions of Economic Preferences in Four 
Countries 
 
Recent experimental and behavioral economic research reveals the traditional definition 
of Homo Economicus is insufficient. Homo Economicus was identified as a self-interested, own 
utility maximizing being. Experimental market and incomplete contract research shows this is 
not always the case. When markets do not work or contracts are not complete, outcomes of the 
transactions depend on parties’ levels of altruism, strategic behavior, tastes, sentiments, and 
other social and cultural preferences (Bowles and Gintis 1993). Thus, a broader understanding 
of social and economic interactions is needed in order to meet moral philosophers’ aspirations 
of understanding the role of society in shaping human behavior.  
  Ecological rationality implies neither the market nor Homo Economicus evolve 
independent of cultural and biological processes. Ecological rationality assumes people use 
rationality passed on through cultural and biological processes when making choices. 
Individuals’ decisions are based on experience and inherited knowledge. The inherited 
knowledge is of an innate nature (Smith 2003). Yet, the role of social and cultural preferences 
and strategic behaviors in completing transactions in and away from the market place are 
seldom captured in economic models, especially general equilibrium models. Samuel Bowles 
(1998) argues that these cultural and individual traits do not only play a role in transactions, but 
are embed in and shaped by the structure and political economy of the market place.  Economic 
forces and market structure are influential to determining the transmission of cultural traits.  
  Recent cross-cultural experimental economic work reveals that there are societal 
differences in economic behavior. Alvin Roth et al. (1991) initiated a stream of work when they  
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used a cross-cultural experiment to test whether subject groups in different international 
locations would follow the game theoretic prediction outcome for the ultimatum bargaining 
game.  They found that subjects did not consistently display behavior consistent with the 
ultimatum game model predictions in any one of the four countries included in the study and 
that patterns of bargaining behavior were statistically different across countries. Following this 
work, Joseph Henrich led a group of researchers to see how ultimatum bargaining behavior 
differed across fifteen small-scale societies. They found there was wide variation in the offers 
across locations: in two societies mean offers were 30 to 40 percent while mean offers 
exceeded 50 percent in other societies (Henrich et al. 2001).  
  These findings and others from cross-cultural investigations of differences in Voluntary 
Contribution Mechanism (VCM) giving and risk behavior indicate that there are cultural and 
societal differences in strategic and economic behavior (Cason et al. 2002, Henrich et al. 2004, 
Weber and Hsee 1998). These studies are enlightening in that they each identify and provide 
information about a behavioral difference across populations, but they are limited in testing for 
the breadth of differences which may exist across cultures. For example, work by other social 
scientists indicates that cultures vary across several different dimensions. Sociologists and 
anthropologist have found cultures to differ in their degree of hierarchy, individualism, 
orientation toward tradition, risk avoidance, egalitarianism, fatalism, and masculinity among 
other traits (Hofstede 1980, 1997; Thompson et al. 1985). Further, often there is an inter-
relationship between dimensions of culture (e.g., collectivist cultures are often very hierarchical 
too). The exploration of economic dimensions of behavioral differences across cultures is 
comparatively very limited to date.   
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  The current study investigates multiple dimensions of economic behavior across 
culturally isolated groups. Experimental economic methods are used to test for location 
differences in strategic and individual decision-making behaviors.  From this, we may be able 
to develop a broader, richer understanding of Homo Economicus using multiple economic 
behavioral measures. Findings indicate that behavior differs in more than one dimension across 
cultures. Strategic behavior is most likely to differ across location groups. 
Objectives  
The primary objective of this work is to measure differences in altruism, reciprocity, 
time preference, risk preference, and tendencies to free-ride in China, France, Niger, Kansas, 
and Indiana.  These experiments are used to test the null hypothesis that economic behavior is 
independent of location. The ultimatum bargaining game and voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM) experiments measure strategic interaction behavior between subjects.  The 
remaining two, the time preference and risk preference experiments, are used to obtain 
measurements of subjects’ individual decision-making behaviors.  
Several features of this study are worth noting.  First, the experiments offer new scope.  
The combination of strategic interaction and individual choice experiments allows rich 
behavioral comparisons across cultures. Second, all of the subjects in this study are college 
students.  This helps to control for relative income differences across subjects.  All of the 
subjects received real cash payments for their participation in the experiments.  They received a 
show-up fee as well as payments for each of the experimental activities
1.  
The four different experiments were conducted in one, master experimental session to 
obtain within subject comparisons across experiments.  The earnings for each of the  
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experiments were not determined until the entire end of the master experimental session to 
prevent earnings from one experiment influencing the subjects’ behavior in another experiment.  
The only experiment in which earnings were discovered as the experiment progressed was the 
VCM, the last and final experiment.  Total earnings from all of the experiments were paid out 
to the subjects at the end of the master experimental session. 
Data  
  The experiments were conducted in Hangzhou, China; Grenoble, France; Niamey, 
Niger; Manhattan, Kansas; and West Lafayette, Indiana from March to through May of 2003.  
The experiment participants included 96 subjects at the Hangzhou site, 70 subjects at the 
Grenoble site, 60 subjects at the Niamey site, 57 subjects at the Manhattan site, and  63 subjects 
at the West Lafayette site.  
  The locations were selected, in part, because of their geographic isolation from each 
other
2.  This enables us to explore differences in economic behavior across groups who have 
different cultural experiences. Previous work by Geert Hofstede (1997) indicates that groups in 
the different countries have historically differed along at least four dimensions of culture: 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. In table 1, one can see 
that Asian, French, and West African cultures all have more power distance or there is a greater 
degree of distance between superiors and their subordinates than in the United States. Both 
United States and French cultures are individualistic relative to Asian and West African 
Cultures. Masculinity is valued higher in the United States than in the other locations. This 
means that in the United States masculine behaviors such as aggression and ambition are 
                                                                                                                                                           
1 The show up fee and experiment payments were converted using the purchasing power parity 
index to ensure relatively equal earnings across locations. 
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valued higher than feminine behaviors which include compassion and passiveness. Finally, the 
French avoid uncertainty more than groups in the other locations. 
Experimental Methods  
The ultimatum bargaining experiment in this study is very similar to that of Guth et al. 
(1982), but the Proposer and Responder decision processes are simultaneous. Thus, the 
extensive form of the game collapses into one step. The Proposer decides how much of their $5 
endowment (or its PPP equivalent in China, France, and Niger) he/she will allocate the 
respondent.  The Proposer has eleven discrete choice options presented to them in a worksheet. 
The options are divided into ten percent increments from zero to 100 percent of the 
endowment. At the same time as the Proposers make their allocation decision, the Respondents 
have a similar worksheet to complete. They decide the minimum amount of the endowment 
they are willing to accept from Proposer. Once the worksheets are marked, the experimenter 
collects them.  
The earnings from this experiment are determined by matching Proposers and 
Respondent answers according to randomly predetermined matching arrangements. If the 
Proposer suggested a payment above the Respondents minimum payment requirement, then the 
allocation is divided as the Proposer suggested. If the Proposer did not make an offer 
acceptable to the Respondent, then neither party receives payment. 
  The VCM was employed to measure individuals’ tendency toward free-riding.  Subjects 
made 16 different investment decisions through eight investment periods in this experiment. In 
each period, they were randomly paired with another, anonymous subject (they were never 
paired with the same subject they were paired with during the ultimatum bargaining game 
                                                                                                                                                           
2 This excludes Manhattan and West Lafayette. Manhattan was selected as a control site to test the degree of 
difference between two more geographically and culturally similar sites.  
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experiment).  Each subject decided how many of thirteen tokens they would invest in a private 
account and how many they would invest in a public account. The investment return to a single 
subject in each period depended on how many tokens he or she invested in the private account 
and how many tokens he or she and the person they were paired with invested in the public 
account in that round.  The return to the public account was three-quarters of the return to the 
private account.  The returns from the private account only accrued to the individual based on 
the number of tokens he or she invested in that account in that period.  The returns to the public 
account accrued to both investors at the same rate and was based on the total number of tokens 
both investors placed in the public account.   
  It was possible for a subject to invest nothing in the public account and still receive the 
return from the tokens the person they were paired with placed in the account. If both 
individuals invested all or almost all of their tokens into the public account, then their total 
earnings in that round would be greater than their earnings if they each invested all of their 
tokens in their individual private accounts.  The degree to which an individual placed tokens in 
their private account instead of the public account is a measure of their free-riding behavior.  
The time preference experiment followed the ultimatum bargaining experiment in the 
master experimental session.  It was used to measure subjects’ discount rates and was based on 
Harrison et al.’s (2002) methodology.  Subjects choose between receiving $5 (or its purchasing 
power equivalent in their country) in one week or a greater amount in 25 weeks.  In the initial 
decisions, subjects choose between receiving $5 in one week or 8% more in 25 weeks.  As they 
moved on from the first decision, they began choosing between receiving $5 in one week and 
an increasingly larger percent of money in 25 weeks.  Their discount rate is measured by 
recording the point at which they move to receiving the money in 25 weeks instead of one  
 8  
week in the decision in table 2.  In other words, what additional percent of $5 would it take to 
induce someone to delay their payment for 25 weeks? The payment is delayed 24 weeks after 
the first payment option. 
  The earnings were determined at the end of the experimental session by randomly 
pulling numbers from an envelope.  Fifteen pieces of paper, numbered one through 15, were 
placed in the envelop.  The experimenter drew out one of the numbers to determine which one 
of the subject’s decisions in the time preference worksheet would be realized.  For example, if 
the experimenter pulled out the number 5, he or she would look to see what the subject marked 
for number 5.  If the subject marked A, then the subject would receive $5 in the mail in one 
week.  The subject would receive $7.00 in the mail in 25 weeks if he/she marked B.  
Measurements of subjects’ relative risk aversion levels are obtained using a worksheet 
of lottery choices similar to that of Holt and Laury (2002).  The students make ten, repeated 
choices over lotteries with varying degrees of risk.  The payoff options are reported in the two 
left-hand columns of table 3. In the first few decisions, the expected payoff is higher for Option 
A and, thus, it is less risky then Option B—there is a low downside risk for Option A.  As the 
subjects continue through the decisions, the expected payoffs for Option B become more 
rewarding as their payoff increases.  Initially, Option B is very risky, with a high probability of 
receiving close to nothing, $0.25. By the last decision, Option B is the most rewarding. There is 
a 100% chance of receiving $9.60 in Option B compared to a 100% chance of receiving $5.00 
in Option A. The relative risk aversion range associated with each choice is displayed in the 
right-hand column of table 3
3.  After students complete the worksheet, a ten-sided die is rolled 
                                                 
3 The Holt and Laury methodology assumes constant relative risk aversion for money x. The 
risk aversion coefficient, r, is derived from the utility function 
r x x u
− =
1 ) (  for  0 > x . A risk  
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to determine which of the choices will be binding.  From the die roll number, the monitor 
checks whether the subject choose Option A or B for that choice.  Then, the die is rolled a 
second time to determine the final outcome.  For example, if the experiment monitor rolled the 
die and produced a three on the first roll, he/she would look at the decision that the subject 
made for the 3
rd choice.  Lets say the subject chooses Option A.  On the second roll of the die, 
the subject will receive $5.00 if the die lands with one to three facing upward and $4.00 if the 
die lands with faces four to ten facing upward.  If the subject had chosen Option B for the 3
rd 
choice, then they would receive $9.60 if the die displayed faces one to three and $0.25 
otherwise.   
Results  
  Results from strategic interaction experiments are presented first, followed by results 
from the individual decision-making experiments.  For each experiment, a general description 
of the outcome from each experiment is first reported.  Second, summary statistics and simple 
statistical tests of location differences in behavior are presented.  Third, typically, econometric 
regression results are reported as the results of the tests of null hypotheses related to the role of 
demographic characteristics and culture on each type of economic behavior.   
A report of the cumulative percent of Proposers not offering minimum amounts of the 
endowment and the cumulative distribution of Respondents’ minimum endowment demands 
are reported in figure 1. The cumulative distributions of Proposers’ minimum endowment 
offers are represented by the dash lines which decrease from the upper left-hand corner of the 
chart to the lower right-hand corner of the chart.  The Respondents’ minimum endowment 
                                                                                                                                                           




cumulative distributions are represented by the series of solid lines which increase in value 
from the lower left-hand corner of the chart to the upper right-hand corner of the chart.   
  The Proposer cumulative distribution is interpreted as the percent of participants who 
were willing to give at least x percent of the endowment. For example, looking at the upper 
left-hand corner of the chart, 100% of the participants in China were willing to give more than 
zero percent and ten percent of the endowment to the Respondent.  Likewise, in Indiana and 
France, 97% of the percent of the Proposers offered more than zero percent of the endowment 
to the Respondents while only 93% of Kansas and Nigeriéns offered more than zero percent of 
the endowment to the Respondents.  
The rate at which minimum offers increased differs across the different locations.  In 
China, low offers appear to be the least acceptable with 98% of Proposers offering at least 30 
percent of the allocation.  In Niger and France, it was more likely that a Proposer would offer 
less to the Respondent. In Niger and France, only 63% and 68% of Proposers, respectively, 
offered more than 30 percent of the endowment to the Respondent. Proposers in Kansas and 
Indiana minimum offer likelihoods decrease at similar rates moving from left to right across the 
chart.  In all locations, less than 20% of the Proposers offered more than fifty percent of the 
endowment. In France, Kansas, and Indiana, less then ten percent of the Proposers offered more 
than 50 percent of the endowment.  
  The minimum Respondent demand cumulative distributions reveal greater differences 
in the rate and frequency in which different groups will accept minimum amounts of the 
endowment. None of the subjects in Niger will accept less then 20 percent of the endowment. 
In contrast, eleven percent of subjects in Kansas are willing to accept nothing from the 
Proposer. The rate of endowment acceptance increases the most dramatically for French  
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subjects.  Only six percent of the subjects will accept nothing from the Proposer, but 56% of 
the subjects will accept only 30 percent of the endowment. The greatest difference in 
acceptance levels exists between Nigerien and French subjects. While 77% of Nigerien subjects 
would accept 50 percent or more of the endowment, only 17% would accept 40 percent or less 
of the endowment. These differences in giving and acceptance rates and the significance of the 
differences are discussed in more detail below.  
The proportion of experiment participants who were willing to accept a given offer in 
the different experiment countries and location is reported in table 4. Starting at the left of the 
table, the first column reports the number of respondents who are willing to accept nothing 
from the Proposer.  Moving across table 4 to the right, the percent of the endowment 
participants are willing to accept increases in ten percent increments.   
Respondents in Kansas and Indiana were the most willing to accept nothing, with an 
average of nine percent of the population stating that they would accept zero percent of the 
endowment in the United States.  The willingness to accept nothing decreased in China and 
France to six percent of the population.  None of the Nigerién subjects were willing to accept 
nothing.  Kansas and French subjects were the most likely to accept allocations of less than 
50% of the original endowment.  Thirty-three percent of Nigerién subjects demanded 50% or 
more of the allocation.  These differences in Respondents’ minimum acceptance levels may 
reflect their expectations of the group.  Respondents in Kansas and Indiana, from more 
individualistic cultures, may allow the Proposer to act in a more self-interested manner while 
individuals from the more collectivist cultures expect their Proposers to be more generous. It is 
clear that French subjects were more willing to accept lower proportions of the endowment  
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than their counterparts in the other countries and that the Nigerién participants demanded a 
larger proportion of the endowment that those in other countries. 
The Wilcoxon test to test for distributional differences in respondents’ minimum 
acceptance levels across locations.  The Wilcoxon test statistics indicate that nearly all of the 
distributions’ respondents’ minimum acceptance amounts are significantly different.  The only 
insignificant differences (p>0.10) are those between Kansas and Indiana, China and Indiana, 
and Kansas and China.  One expects the behavior between Indiana and Kansas subjects to be 
the same.  One may expect differences between Chinese and American subjects because of the 
cultural and governmental differences between the two societies. In past studies, however, 
Chinese and American students have behaved in like ways when the Chinese subjects were in 
an anonymous experiment environment such as the current experiment (Kachelmeier and 
Shehata 1997). Thus, due to the combination of similar individualistic believes among subjects 
in the United States and China, and the anonymity of the experiment, it may not be surprising 
that the subjects’ behavior is similar in both countries in this experiment.   
Table 5 shows the percent of Proposers offering a given proportion or percentage of 
their endowment to the Respondents.  One will observe that the majority of Proposers offered 
half of the endowment to the Respondent in every country except France. There, less than half 
of the Proposers offered half of the endowment.  In France, the largest group of Proposers 
offered less than 50% of the endowment to the Respondents.  In Niger, the largest share of 
Proposers (37%) offered half of the endowment.  Kansas had the highest percentage of 
Proposers offering half of the endowment (76%). In China, 98% of the Proposers offered 
between 40% and 70% of their endowment.  None of the Chinese subjects offered either  
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nothing or everything to their Respondent.  In all of the other locations except China and 
Kansas, a small percentage of Proposers did offer to give the Respondent all of the endowment.  
Wilcoxon tests of distributional differences in Proposers’ offer amounts across locations 
reveal there are fewer significant differences in Proposer offer rates compared to differences in 
Respondent acceptance rates.  Again, Kansas and Indiana are similar, but the distribution of 
offer rates of China is different from Indiana.  This reflects the increased tendency of Chinese 
Proposers to make offers around 50%, relative to Proposers in Indiana and Kansas.  Niger does 
not have a significantly different distribution (p>0.10) to Indiana and France. 
The large decrease in the number of accepted offers in Niger is worthy of discussion.  
This is one location that, prior to the experiment, Proposers may have been better informed of 
the likelihood that their offer will be accepted or rejected.  Of the four countries studied, there 
is more money sharing and lending amongst Nigerién household, family, and tribal members 
than in the other countries.  Due to the smaller number of accessible trustworthy banking 
institutions and lack of savings accounts, many individuals often go to family members and 
friends for loans and money gifts.  The country also has a very high unemployment rate. Many 
people may be supported by one wage earner.  Not only are individuals often asking to borrow 
or called upon to lend money, food is also a common good that is shared.  At night, poorer 
families walk the streets of Niamey with empty bowls to collect the leftover food from families 
who were able to prepare fresh food that day.   
Given the openness of interpersonal transfers in this society, it may be surprising that 
there were not more matches in the ultimatum bargaining experiment (i.e. Responders indicated 
a minimum willingness to accept below the Proposers’ offers).  Several possible explanations 
may account for the apparent decreased altruism in Niger despite prevalent gift-giving in the  
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country. First, the gift-giving that is observed on a daily basis may not be motivated by 
altruism.  Rather, individuals may give gifts as a form of property insurance.  Gift-giving may 
prevent poorer people from coming to your house to try to steal food or money.  Economic 
behavioral research in rural Paraguay finds that farmers give gift of foods to the poor to prevent 
theft from their fields (Schechter 2004).  Likewise, in Niger, it may be wise to give some 
money or food regularly in order to prevent theft. Second, because money lending between 
friends and especially family members is more common in Niger, individuals may be more 
conservative when giving it away.  There often is one wage earner in a household (the 
household can include multiple generations, wives and their children, and adult siblings and 
their families) and this earner is often called upon to provide for a multitude of individuals.  
When asked to give money to one person, the money holder may be conservative with the 
allocation, knowing that many more requests may come to him/her for money from the same 
pool of money. Thus, he or she may offer less than the person will request. 
  The anonymous aspect of the experiment also presents a very different condition from 
that individuals face in Nigerién society.  In the experiment, Responders do not know who 
Proposers are.  Therefore, the Proposer does not have to worry about being approached 
afterward if the Respondent does not like the offer the Proposer makes.  This may have allowed 
the Proposers, especially, and the Respondents to act in a less altruistic and less reciprocal 
manner than they would in everyday life. 
The second strategic interaction experiment to be considered is the VCM. Behavior in 
the VCM is different across locations.  An overview of the mean token contributions to the 
VCM private account is presented in table 6. The biggest contrast in behavior occurs between 
France and Niger.  In Niger, subjects invested a greater percent of their tokens in the private  
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account from the onset and did not change their investment strategy as much as subjects in 
other countries did.  Over the course of the eight rounds of the game, French subjects behavior 
changed drastically as they went from high public good contributions to the lowest level of 
public account contributions in the last round of the experiment.  This section of the essay 
reports and discusses the findings from the VCM public goods game in detail. 
  Overall, the average number of contributions to the private account increases in the 
latter rounds of the experiment (see table above).  In all countries except Niger (where private 
account contributions remained high), participants put less than half of their tokens in the 
private account in the first three rounds.  Then, in the fourth and fifth rounds they begin to more 
than half of their tokens in the private account.  By the last round, over 80 percent of their 
tokens are in the private account.  In contrast, subjects in the United States, China, and Niger 
were all contributing an average of 69% of their tokens into the private account in the last 
round.  
The greatest amount of variability of token contribution took place in France during the 
first 6 rounds of the game.  The French subjects were observed to take more of an “all or 
nothing” approach or strategy to the experiment.  Many subjects would either place all of their 
tokens in the private account or all of their tokens in the public account during the initial rounds 
of the game.  As they moved through the rounds and saw lower returns from the group account, 
the majority began putting all of their tokens in the private account, bringing down the 
deviation in investment patterns.   
  Figure 2 offers an alternative view of the VCM results where the average contributions 
to the public account are reported. One can see that the French subjects reached a much 
stronger “free-riding” equilibrium than their counterparts.  Investment behavior changed from  
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low-levels of free-riding to higher levels of free-riding in every country.  The country with the 
least amount of behavioral change across rounds was Niger, where there were higher levels of 
investment into the private account or free-riding in the initial rounds of the experiment than in 
any other country.   
Tests for behavioral differences across locations will focus on the first-round of the 
VCM. The contribution statistics for this round are displayed in table 7. The average first round 
contribution to the public account across the entire population was 7.25 tokens. By location, the 
average contribution in the Chinese experiments is closest to this, 7.49 tokens.  The average 
first-round token contribution in Niger is the lowest, 5.02 tokens. The least variability in first-
round token contributions occurs in Niger while the highest is in Kansas. There are differences 
in mean first-round VCM contributions across subject gender. Across all locations, men 
contributed an average of 7.76 tokens, one more token then women did on average.   
Ordinary least squares regression analysis of first period token contributions into the 
public account reveals that rates of contributions are significantly different across countries and 
gender (see table 8). The dependent variable in the regression is the number of tokens 
contributed to the public account. Dummy variables are used to represent subjects’ nationality 
and gender in the reduced form model. The country variables take on a one value if the subject 
is from that country and are zero otherwise. Niger is omitted as an alternate country. The 
female gender variable takes a value of one for female subjects and is zero otherwise. The 
results indicate that average contributions from men in each country into the public account in 
the first round are greater than Nigerien subject contributions in all alternative countries. 
Kansas men contributed an average of over four more tokens than Nigerien men did to the 
public account in the first round. At every location, women tended to contribute less to the  
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public account then men, but this was significant in only two places, China and Kansas.  In 
both places, women contributed at least two fewer tokens than men did to the public account. 
Thus, men were initially more cooperative than women in these locations.    
  As one can see from figure 2, the rate of decline of public account token contributions 
appears to be significantly different across different locations.  On average, across all countries, 
individuals decreased their public good investments by 33.96 percent. Ordinary least squares 
regression is used to test the effect of location and gender on rate of change in public good 
investment across rounds.  The percentage change in contributions from round 1 to round 8 is 
the dependent variable for the regression results reported in table 9. There are significant 
differences across locations in their public good investments from round one to round eight or 
the first to final rounds (relative to Niger). Chinese, Indianan, and French subjects’ rate of 
decline was much greater than that of Nigerien subjects. One could infer that cooperation 
decreased the most in these countries across time. Despite the overall decline in cooperation 
across all locations, women more are likely to continue to contribute to the public account.  
Further analysis shows that the mean decline in VCM public accounts is 42.59 percent among 
men and only 25.52 percent among women across all locations. It appears that although their 
cooperation declines, women were more willing to continue to perpetuate cooperation across 
the different rounds. 
The time preference experiment is the first of the two individual choice experiments to 
be considered. The results from the time preference experiment indicate there are limited 
location based differences in time preferences.  Before we report the experiment results, we 
want to note that China is not included in the analysis. The worksheets used to measure time 
preference were not correct in China and the data from the Chinese experiment can not be used.    
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  Table 10 reports the mean estimated annual discount rate for the different locations and 
demographic groups using interval censored estimates. The mean discount rate for all countries 
is 165.51 percent.  This is much higher than the discount rate found by Harrison et al. (2002) in 
the Danish population, but well within the possible range of discount rates from meta-analysis 
by Frederick et al. (2002).    The standard error of Nigerien subjects’ discount rates is higher 
than the other locations.  Comparing the other four locations, Nigerién subjects had the highest 
estimated average discount rate, 208.57 percent, followed by Indiana, 177.07 percent.  
Indiana’s estimated discount rate is over 35 percentage points higher than either Kansas or 
France.   
  The discount rate means are also estimated for different demographic group.  The 
average median discount rates are very similar for men and women, 163.04 and 168.06 percent.  
The variation is greater for discount rate comparisons across working status groups.
4  There is 
only one subject who identified him/herself as working full-time.  He/She had an estimated 
average discount rage of 207.97 percent.  The other working groups included students who 
identified themselves as working part-time or were enrolled in a work study program (this 
mainly includes subjects in the United States).  The work study students had the lowest average 
estimated annual discount rate of the working population, 135.87 percent, and the part-time 
working students had the highest, 177.34 percent.  The individuals who were full-time students 
(i.e., did not work) had average discount rates of 168.16 percent.   
                                                 
4 Working status is included as a proxy for income in this experiment.  All of the subjects in the experiment were 
enrolled as undergraduate students at a university.  However, they may have work different amounts outside of 
school depending on their overall wealth level.  It is assumed that more needy students will pursue employment 
outside of school.    
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An interval censored model is used to test the effect of location, culture, and 
demographic characteristics on time preference behavior following Harrison et al. (2002).  The 
following these null hypotheses are tested using this model: 
1.  A subject’s discount rate range is independent of location.   
2.  A subject’s discount rage range is independent of gender. 
3.  The experimental time preference measurements are independent of income. 
The hypotheses are tested using an interval censored regression model using the 
following functional relationship for each individual i: [Minimum Discount Ratei, Maximum 
Discount Ratei]=f(Locationi, Genderi, Academic Majori, Employment Statusi, and Culturei).  
Location is included by using a binary (0,1) indicator variable for each location (i.e. China, 
France, Indiana, Kansas, and Niger).  The gender or female variable takes on a value of one if 
the participant is female and zero otherwise.  Four additional dummy variables are used to 
classify each individual into one of four different working statuses: full-time employment, part-
time employment, or full-time student.  Working status is used to indicate economic 
background. Niger and “Other Work” are omitted as relative comparison variables for the 
location and academic major groups of variables. 
  The interval-censored regression results for the test of the null hypotheses are displayed 
in table 11 (they were estimated using the Lifereg procedure in SAS).  The overall likelihood 
ratio test indicates that all coefficients are significantly different from zero.  One of the three 
null hypotheses are rejected.  Subjects’ discount rates are not independent of location. Their 
discount rates do appear to be independent of income measures and gender. There are only two 
significant variable coefficients.  There are associated with the France (P<0.05) and Kansas 
(p<0.05) dummy variables.    
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  The results from the risk experiment are analyzed in a similar fashion to the time 
preference experiment. The mean estimated relative risk aversion coefficients for different 
demographic groups are presented in table 12.  These are calculated using the interval censored 
procedure similar to that used for the discount rate. In general, across the total population and 
all subgroups, the estimated relative risk aversion coefficient is positive and, thus, it is assumed 
that the average subject is relatively risk averse. The total average relative risk aversion 
coefficient is 0.4151. Across the locations, China subjects have the lowest relative risk aversion 
coefficient on average while Indianan subjects have the highest relative risk aversion 
coefficient on average.  Niger has the largest confidence interval. It is six times larger than any 
of the confidence intervals associate with the other estimates—an indication of the degree of 
heterogeneity in the risk aversion behavior in Niger. The average estimated relative risk 
aversion coefficient is higher for women than men, 0.4344 versus 0.3943.  The individual who 
is employed full-time in addition to being a student appears to have mean relative risk aversion 
coefficients that is nearly twice the average for the other working groups.  It does appear that 
more risk averse individuals are working students.  
  An interval censored model is used to derive the parameter estimates to explain 
differences in the estimated relative risk aversion coefficients across different groups.  Four 
different model specifications were tested in the development of the model displayed in table 
13.  The preliminary model tested only the effect of location on the estimated relative risk 
aversion coefficient.  The next included both location variables and a gender variable to test the 
effect of gender on the estimated relative risk aversion coefficient.  None of the parameters in 
these preliminary models were significant.  More analysis will be conducted to attain more 
information about the heterogeneity of risk preferences within location.  
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Conclusions 
The economic experiments conducted in this research reveal that the degree of location 
differences in economic behavior differ by the type of the behavior being measured. There is 
more variability across locations in subjects’ strategic economic behavior than for individual 
decision making behavior. The VCM and ultimatum bargaining game experiment were used to 
measure cooperation and reciprocity. Findings from these experiments indicate that Nigerien 
subjects were the least cooperative and least altruistic. While Nigerien Responders had high 
offer expectations in the ultimatum bargaining game experiment, the Proposers were 
conservative in their proposals and much less likely to meet Responders demands than 
Proposers in other countries. French and American Respondents had the lowest offer 
expectations and Proposers often met these expectations. Chinese Responders offers 
expectations were very close to Proposers, where 50% of the endowment was often exchanged. 
In the VCM, the French subjects’ behavior was the most dynamic. They gave the 
greatest, average amount of tokens to the public account in the first round, but had the lowest 
average public account token contributions by the eighth round of the game. There was little 
behavioral adjustment by Nigerien subjects across rounds. They gave less than 40% of their 
tokens to the public account in the first round of the VCM. Indianan, Chinese, and Kansan 
subjects behaved most similarly in the VCM.  They contributed approximately 60% of their 
tokens to the public account in the first round and approximately 30% of their tokens to the 
public account in the last round of the VCM. 
Behavioral differences are less marked across individual decision making experiments. 
There is a significant difference in Nigerien subject behavior and other subject behavior in the 
time preference experiment. The Nigerien subjects had a significantly higher discount rate than  
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Indianan, Kansan, and French subjects on average. There are not any significant differences in 
risk behavior across locations. 
These results do reinforce Bowles’ (1998) and Smith’s (2003) arguments that economic 
interaction is related to cultural and biological processes. Individuals who have different 
evolutionary experiences in geographically isolated groups behave differently across a variety 
of economic contexts, especially those involving strategic interaction. The difference in 
experimental economic outcomes for strategic interaction and individual decision making 
experiments has great implications for policy and development work across geographic 
locations. The increased degree of difference in behavioral outcomes for the strategic 
interaction experiments indicates that policy development for projects which include group 
interaction and collaboration need more thought. Incentives which work to encourage 
investment in a public project in one location may not transfer to another location. On the other 
hand, if one is trying to induce investment into a private venture, investment incentives will be 
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Table 1. The Value Survey Module (VSM) index scores for China, France, Niger, and the 
United States (Hofstede 1997) 
 




b  68 25 57 29 
France 68  71  43  86 
West Africa
 b 77  20  46  54 
United States  40  91  62  46 
a The index scores for each cultural measurement range from 0 to 100. A score of 100 indicates 
a culture which places great importance on that value. A score of 0 indicates little importance is 
put on the relating value. 
b Direct data is not available for China and Niger. Index scores for Hong Kong and West Africa 
are used for China and Niger, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2.  Discount rate measurement exercise with interest rate information for time preference 
experiment (United States version) 
















1 $5.00  $5.40  8.00%  18.19%    
2 $5.00  $5.80  16.00%  38.00%    
3 $5.00  $6.20  24.00%  59.49%    
4 $5.00  $6.60  32.00%  82.67%    
5 $5.00  $7.00  40.00%  107.55%    
6 $5.00  $7.40  48.00%  134.16%    
7 $5.00  $7.80  56.00%  162.51%    
8 $5.00  $8.20  64.00%  192.61%    
9 $5.00  $8.60  72.00%  224.47%    
10 $5.00  $9.00  80.00%  258.13%    
11 $5.00  $9.40  88.00%  293.58%    
12 $5.00  $9.80  96.00%  330.84%    
13 $5.00  $10.20 104.00%  369.93%    
14 $5.00  $10.60 112.00%  410.86%    
15 $5.00  $11.00 120.00%  453.63%    





Table 3.  United States version of risk experiment payoffs and associated relative risk aversion 
coefficient for the ten paired lottery-choice decisions 







1/10 of $5.00, 9/10 of $4.00  1/10 of $9.60, 9/10 of $0.25  $2.92  -∞to -1.72  
2/10 of $5.00, 8/10 of $4.00  2/10 of $9.60, 8/10 of $0.25  $2.08  -1.71 to -0.95 
3/10 of $5.00, 7/10 of $4.00  3/10 of $9.60, 7/10 of $0.25  $1.25  -0.94 to -0.49 
4/10 of $5.00, 6/10 of $4.00  4/10 of $9.60, 6/10 of $0.25  $0.41  -0.48 to -0.15 
5/10 of $5.00, 5/10 of $4.00  5/10 of $9.60, 5/10 of $0.25  -$0.43  -0.14 to 0.14 
6/10 of $5.00, 4/10 of $4.00  6/10 of $9.60, 4/10 of $0.25  -$1.26  0.15 to 0.41 
7/10 of $5.00, 3/10 of $4.00  7/10 of $9.60, 3/10 of $0.25  -$2.10  0.42 to 0.67 
8/10 of $5.00, 2/10 of $4.00  8/10 of $9.60, 2/10 of $0.25  -$2.93  0.68 to 0.97 
9/10 of $5.00, 1/10 of $4.00  9/10 of $9.60, 1/10 of $0.25  -$3.77  0.98 to 1.37 







































Indiana R Kansas R China R Niger R France R Indiana P China P
Kansas P Niger P France P
Figure 1. Cumulative Distributions of Proposers’ Minimum Endowment Offers (P) and 





Table 4.  Respondents’ Cumulative Minimum Required Endowment Allocation Demands 
 
Endowment 
Allocation  0% 10% 20% 30%  40%  50%  60% 70% 80% 90%  100% 
 
Number of  
Responders  Percent of Respondents 
Total 
USA 58  9 14 19 22  48  97  98 98 98 98  100 
Indiana   30  7 13 17 17  47  93  97 97 97 97  100 
Kansas   28  11  14  21  29 50 100  100  100  100  100  100 
China 47  6 6  6 17 51  96 96  96  98  98 100 
Niger 30  0 0  0 10 17  77 83  87  90  93 100 












































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.  The mean number and standard deviation of tokens contributed to the private account 
in each round of the public goods experiment across experiments. 
      Number Mean of Tokens Contributed To Private Account 
 Site 
# of 
Obs.     Round 1  Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5  Round 6  Round 7  Round 8 
Indiana   63  Mean  5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 
      S.D  4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
Kansas 57 Mean  5 6 6 6 7 7 8 9 
      S.D.  4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 
China 96  Mean  6 6 6 7 7 7 8 9 
      S.D.  3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 
Niger 60  Mean  9 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 
      S.D.  3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
France 70  Mean  5 5 6 8 8 9  10  11 
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Table 7. Mean first-round contributions to the VCM by demographic group 
Demographic 
Group 
Average First-Round Public Account 
Contribution   Standard Error 
  (Tokens)     
Total   7.25  0.22 
    
Location     
China   7.49 0.66 
France  7.99 0.71 
Kansas   7.78 0.75 
Indiana  7.73 0.73 
Niger  5.02 0.52 
Gender    
Female   6.75 0.44 
Male  7.76 0.32 
 
Table 8.  Ordinary least squares regression estimation with location and gender variables to 




Intercept 5.0811**  0.6542 
China 3.5059**  0.8788 
France   3.2523**  0.9133 
Kansas 4.3102**  1.0567 
Indiana 2.7589**  1.0303 
Female*China -2.1380**  0.8170 
Female*France -0.7850  0.9575 
Female*Kansas -2.7148*  1.0744 
Female*Indiana -0.1821  1.0248 
Female*Niger -0.1680  1.0567 
F=4.16, R
2=.1006 








Table 9. Ordinary least square regression of the percentage change in token contributions to the 




Intercept -10.2743  13.4880 
China -35.8605*  16.4170 
France -58.9427**  17.5006 
Kansas -21.8916  18.5305 
Indiana -41.5329*  18.0889 
Female 18.5091*  10.8304 
   F=3.03,  p=0.0108 











Total* 165.51  7.51 
     
Location     
France  138.67  20.31 
Kansas  142.01  20.96 
Indiana  177.07  21.16 
Niger  208.57  15.28 
     
Gender     
Women   163.04  10.29 
Men  168.06  10.95 
     
Employment     
Full-Time  207.97  NA 
Part-Time  177.34  17.75 
Student Only  168.16  9.84 
Work Study  135.87  15.80 












Intercept 2.0400**  0.4199 
France   -0.7153**  0.2029 
Indiana   -0.3092  0.2191 
Kansas -0.6465**  0.2279 
Female 0.0287  0.1480 
Full-Time 
Employment 0.6578  1.1575 
Part-Time 
Employment 0.1454  0.4240 
Full-Time Student  0.0360  0.4071 
Work Study  -0.2429  0.4533 
*=90% significant  
**=95% significant 
αModel likelihood test ratio is 17.596 (p<0.025)  
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Table 12.  The average estimated relative risk aversion levels for the China, France, Indiana, 








Total 0.4151  0.0504 
    
Location    
Indiana  0.4997 0.0525 
Kansas  0.4823 0.0609 
China  0.2887 0.0550 
Niger  0.4304 0.3140 
France  0.4542 0.0533 
    
Gender    
Female  0.4344 0.0378 
Male  0.3943 0.0932 
    
Employment    
Full-time  0.8423 0.2216 
Part-time  0.4327 0.0610 
Student Only  0.4328 0.0726 
Work Study   0.4198 0.0786 




Table 13.  Relative risk aversion interval censored regression  




Intercept -0.0863  0.3237 
China -0.1193  0.1680 
Indiana 0.1192  0.1862 
Kansas 0.1084  0.1931 
France 0.0788  0.1756 
Female 0.0230  0.1024 
Full-Time 
Employment 0.9336  0.7055 
Part-Time 
Employment   0.4388  0.3198 
Full-Time Student   0.4882  0.3049 
Work Study   0.4719  0.3294 
*=90% significant  
**=95% significant 
Note: None of the coefficient values are significant.  
 
 